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USE OF

WTO

PANEL DECISIONS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION UNDER U.S. ANTIDUMPING

LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

For nearly sixty years, the United States has participatcd in international
trade agreements stemming from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT'').! From the beginning, GATT included a dispute resolution system to
settle disagreements among party-states; however, the consent nature of the
dispute resolution proceedings threatened the viability of the structure. 2 The veto
power, "the voluntary nature of membership in GATT, [and] a nation's ability to
block the operation of the GATT dispute settlement procedure" rendered the
regime vulnerable to unilateral destabilization.' In the Uruguay Round of 1994,
GATT countries gathered and, among other things, formed the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"). The WTO has, in turn, spawned a jurisprudence of its
own in the form of panel and appellate decisions.
This body of international jurisprudence sometimes conflicts with the
actions of U.S. administrative agencies responsible for the regulation of intemational trade. U.S. courts confront this conflict between WTO panel decisions and
U.S. administrative agency actions with two competing doctrines: (I) the

I General Agreel11ent on TarifTs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947.61 Stat. A-II. T.I.A.S. 1700,55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT], For a concise history of dispute resolution under the old GATT and WTO systel11s, see
Susan H. Shin, Comparisoll oj the f)ispil/c '<;('II/cl11(,111 Proccdures oj fhe tf'or/d Trade Org,ani::.atioll ji),. Tracie
Dispules (/Ild Ihe 1II/('I'-AII/('ri('(/II.';\,,I/olI /orlluHIlIIl Righl,l lio!"liol!,I. 16 N.Y. IN!'! L. Rc\·. 43, 47 (2003).
2 Shin, sl/I'm note I.

3 Jd. at 4R.
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Chel'ron doctrine,4 which dictates that a court will gIve great deference to an
administrative agency's interpretation of ambiguous congressional legislation,
complemented by a general judicial deference to executive actions

111

foreign

affairs, and (2) the Charming Bet.,y doctrine,) which encourages courts to
interpret legislation, including treaties, so as not to violate international law. In
the context of this comment, both of these doctrines are seen as interpretive
canons.
Interpretive canons are tools that courts use to decide between different
possible interpretations of an ambiguous statute or treaty. Courts apply the law,
and sometimes Congress leaves a statute open to various possible interpretations.
Congress may do so either because it wishes to avoid the political costs of clearly
speaking on an issue or because the subject matter of the legislation is extremely
complex and the executive branch() has a unique institutional compctcnce in a
particular area. In international trade law, congressional action (in the form of
treaties and statutes) is often lacking in detail rcgarding the implemcntation of
U.S. trade policies. This can lead to a connict between a WTO panel decision

about obligations under an international agrecment and a U.S. administrative
agency's assessment of those same obligations.

4 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Rcsources Dcr Council. Inc., 4(,7 U.S. X37, X42 X43 (19~4). See
discussiol! ill/m Part IV.B.I.

S Murray v. Schooner Channing Betsy, (, U.S. 64, II K (I K(4).

SI!I!

discussion ill/ra Part IV.B.2.

(, For the purposes of this comment, the executive branch of the U.S. govcrnmcnt includes all of the
administrative agencies responsible for the enforcemcnt and implementation of congrcssionallcgislation. Thus,
the terms "cxccutivc," the "Coml11ercc Dcpartmcnt" (or simply "Commcrcc"), and thc "Intcrnational Trade
Administration" ("Trade Administration") all posse" essentially the same relationship to the judiciary and
Congrcss.
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This commcnt will: (I) cxplain thc leading

u.s. Antidumping Law

u.s.

federal court precedent

in addressing the conflict between WTO panel decisions and executive action in
antidumping regulation; (2) briefly summarize the reasoning behind the
precedent and the counter arguments to that reasoning; and (3) propose a
consistent approach to the application of WTO panel decisions in litigation
involving interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and its implementing
legislation. Specifically, I propose that WTO panel decisions be given more
weight than they arc now; panel decisions should set up a presumption of the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of executive interpretation of Congressional
legislation. This presumption could be rebutted by evidence of a pressing need
for a court to defer to the executive under traditional political deference
doctrines.
This comment

IS

limited to the narrow context of administrative

implementation of antidumping law in the United States and the tension that
results when that implementation ditTers from a WTO panel decision.
Antidumping law is particularly useful as an avenue of analysis because it both
circumscribes the extent of analysis and provides an insight deep into the
doctrinal heart of the issues. I do not attempt in this paper to tackle the entire
issue of the applicability of international law in U.S. courts, nor even the more
limited issue ofapplication ofWTO panel decisions generally in domestic courts.
Also, I will not attempt here to explain or examine the general issue of judicial
deference to the executive in foreign affairs. Rather, I use the recent decision in

239

Spring 2005

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

Corus v. United States 7 and other recent federal court decisions regarding
antidumping to gain a useful vantage on this developing tension in international
law.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND, ANTIDUMPING LAW, AND TilE

WTO

AGREEMENT

A. Explanation o/"tile Internatiol7al Anti-DulIlping Agreement and
Its Implementing Legislation in the United States
"Dumping" has been variously defined. x Generally, "[dJumping is a
species of price discrimination. "9 Speci fically, it is "the practice of charging a
lower price in the export market than in the home market for similar
merchandise, taking account of any differenees in the conditions of sale and the
characteristics of the merchandise."lo

u.s.

federal law adopts this definition. According to U.S. federal

antidumping legislation, dumping occurs when "a class or kind of foreign
merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its
fair value, and ... an industry in the United States is materially injured, or is
threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United
States

IS

materially retarded."11 According to the U.S. statutory regime, the

7 Corus Eng'g Steels Ltd. v. United States, No. OJ-IIO (Cl. InC! Trade Aug. 27, 2(03). See
discussion il/!i-a Part II.C.
8 Michael S. Knoll, Ulliled Sill II's .llIlii/L1l1/pilig LillI" Till' (·lIsejiJ,. Rl!collsidl'ralioJ/, 22 TeX. IN ,'/
L. J. 265, 266 (I 9X7); Id a/ n.2 (pointing out that among othcr dclinitions, dumping has becn dctined as: "1.
Sale at prices belov. foreign market pricesl; I 2. Sale at prices v.ith which I I()reignl competitors cannot copel; I
3. Sale at prices abroad which arc lower than currcnt home priccsl; and I 4. Sale at priccs unrcmuncrative to the
scllcrs").

9 1<1. at 266.
10 !d. at 267.
II 19 U .S.c. ~ 1673 ( 19(4). The statu Ie cmpowers the Departmcnt ofCommcrcc to"l imposc I upon
such merchandise all antidumping duty, in addition to any other duly ill1po:-.cd, ill an amollnt equal to the amollnt
by which the normal \ aluc exceeds the export price (or the constructed cxport price) 1(11' the mcrehandise." It!.
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"administering authority" shall determine "antidumping duties" by comparing
the "normal value and export price (or constructed export price) of each entry of
the subject merchandise" and calculate "the dumping margin for each such
entry." 12
The U.S. "administering authority" for the regulation of antidumping
violations is the International Trade Administration ("Trade Administration"), a
division of the Department of Commerce ("Commerce"). The Trade
Administration regulates antidumping by investigating alleged violations of
antidumping law and assessing antidumping duties. 13 Decisions by the Trade
Administration can be appealed to the Court of Intemational Trade. 14 However,
the findings of the Trade Administration are given substantial deference. I)
The Trade Administration was established as an independent agency
within the Depaliment of Commerce in order to "insulate the Government's
decision to impose antidumping duties from narrowly political concerns."J() U.S.
antidumping law is largely a direct implementation of U.S. international obligations under Article VI of GATT. 17 The Uruguay Round of 1994 attempted to
harmonize antidumping regulation among the GATT countries. The U.S. trade
negotiators exited the Uruguay Round with the high hope that "all countries
which become members of the [WTOl will be subject to the same antidumping
12 19 U.s.C.A. ~ 1675(a)(2)(A) (1994).
13 For a very Ihorough di,cussion of this process. sec The L'mgllal" ROlllld Agre('l1/ellts Act
Statell/ellt of Adlilillistruti"e Actioll .. Igreelilellt (III .1l1tidllllljJillg (Sept. 27, 1994), 1994 WL 761788 [hereinafkr
Antidumping Statemcnt!. Seea!so 19U.s.C.A. ~ 1671 (1994).

14 19 U.S.c. ~ 1516(c) (1994)

15 21 A AM. JllR. 21l CustOIl/S alld Dlltil!s IlIIl'or' Reglliatiolls ~ 2X I (2004).
16 Fcd. Mogul Corp. v. Unitcd Stales. (,3 F,3d 1572. 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
17 (lATT. sllpra note I.
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ruleS."IX In the U.S. publication of its understanding, it "recognize[d] the need
for a common understanding of the obligations of Members" of GATT.19
Inevitably, not all countries agree about the proper enforcement of antidumping
rules.

B.

wro

Panel Decisiol1s

Article 23 of the GATT agreement set up a mutual obligation among
parties of the WTO to submit disputes to the WTO dispute resolution system and
accept resolutions achieved within that system.20 The Uruguay Round of 1994 set
up a dispute resolution system superior to the old dispute resolution system under
GATT. 2 I Among

the

improvements

were

fixed

timetables,

increased

independence of the tribunal, and speedier and more predictable proeedures. 22
The new dispute resolution system, consisting of the Dispute Settlement Body

I g Antidumping Statcmcnt, slIl'ra notc 13 ("Unlike thc 1979 Tokyo Round Antidumping Code (the
1979 Code), all countries which become mcmbcrs of the World Trade Organization (WTO) will bc subject to
thc same antidumping rules.").
19 Ullderslwulillg Oil Ih" /lIlerf!r"I(/I;OIl of.lrli"/,, XXII' of Ih" (j(,II(!I'a/ .·lgr""II/i'1I1 Oil Tilri//.' (/ild
/<)<)4. Final Act Embodying the Results ofthc Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations General
Agreement on TaritTs and Tradc, April 15,200-1,33 I.L.M. 125 (1994),1994 WL 761-1S3.
];-ad('

20 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing thc World Trade Organization, Anncx 2, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1241 (1994).
GATT. Annex 2, Article 23(2) states:
In such cases, Mcmbers shall:
(a) not make a determination to the ctkclthat a violation has occurred, that benctiis have
been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered
agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in
accordance with the rules and proccdurcs of this Undcrstanding, and shallmakc any such
determination consistent with the tindings contained in the panel or Appellate Body
report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding.
Id
21 Shin. slIf!ra note I at 4~ 49.
22 World Trade Organization, Ullder.'fol/(lillg Ih" liTO: Selllillg IJiSf!lIlcs, a/
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tife/displc.htmlfappcals (last visited Mar. 26, 20(5) ("A
procedure for settling disputes existed under the old GATT. but it had no lixed timetables, rulings were easier
to block. and many cases dragged on for a long time inconclusively. The Uruguay Round agreemcnt introduced
a more structured process with more clearly detined stages in the procedure.").
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("DSB" or "panel") and the Appellate Body,21 have fixed procedural rules and
deadlines and a clear appeals process that ensures finality.24
Dispute resolution in the WTO system has three steps: (1) consuHation,
(2) panel decision, and (3) the appeals process. 25 When parties first disagree, they

submit their dispute to the WTO, and the organization facilitates a period of
consultation. During consultation, the state parties attempt to resolve their
conflict. Failing that, the parties submit their dispute to a panel. The panel hears
the parties' case and renders a decision on the dispute. The "first rulings" made
by the panel can then be endorsed or rejected by the WTO's full membership.2b
More often, the Appellate Body reviews the decisions made by the panel. "The
Appellate Body can uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions
of a panel, and Appellate Body Reports, once adopted by the Dispute Settlement
Body, must be accepted by the parties to the dispute."n

23 World Trade Organi7ation, nil"!,lIle Sell/ell/(,III: .I/,/wl/ole Bod,', III http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop e. dispu e/appellate body e.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 20()5).
The Appellate Body was established in 1995 under Article 17 of the Understanding on
Rules and Proccdurcs (joverning the Settlement of Disputcs. It is a standing body of
seven persons that hears appeals hom reports issued by panels in disputes brought by
WTO Membcrs .... Thc Appcllate Hody has its scat in Gcneva, Switzcrland.

Id
24 World Trade Organization, Lilldenlolll/ill,!; Ihe 11 TO, I'llI'm note

n.

Dispute settlcmcnt is thc central pillar ofthc multilateral trading systcm. and the WTO's
unique contribution to the stability of the glohal economy. Without a means of scttling
disputcs. the rules-based system would hc less effective because the rules could not he
en(l)rced. The WTO's procedure underscores the rule of law, and it makes the trading
system more secure and predictable. The system is based on clearly-detined rules, with
timetables j(,r completing a case.

Id.
25 Shin, I'llI'm note I at 49-51.

26 World Trade Organization, .I'llI'm note 22. The dccision is madc by a conscnsus ofthc WTO\ full
membcrship. Obviously, this rarely takes place.

n

Iii.
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Tension Between U.S Domestic LaI\' and /lItel"l1atiollal Law

Conls v. U.s., deeided in the U.S. Court of International Trade in August
of 2003, concerned a conflict between an executive interpretation of legislation
implementing the Anti-Dumping Agreement and a contrary interpretation of
obligations under the agreement by a WTO panel.2 x

Corus Group PLC,29

formerly, British Steel, owns the largest steel producing companies in the United
Kingdom. Corus Engineering Steels Ltd. ("Corus"), a subsidiary of Corus Group
PLC, manufactures steel and imports large amounts of steel into the U.S.l11
Several steel manufacturers in the U.S. complained to the U.S.
Commerce Department that Corus 11 was allegedly dumping its steel products into
the U.S. markeP2 Commerce decided that Corus was, in fact, illegally dumping
steel products in the U.S. market and assessed a duty equal to the level of
dumping.]] Corus appealed the finding and argued that it sold the stccl products,
on average, at or above the U.S. market priee. 14 Corus argued that Commerce's

2g No. 03-110, slip op. at I (Ct. Int'I Trade Aug. 27, 20(3).
29 According to the eorus website:
Corus Iis I an internalionalmelal company. providing steel and aluminum produds and
services to customers worldwide. With an annual turnover of £X billion and major
operating facilities in thc Netherlands, Ciermany, France, Norway and Belgium, COrtlS
employs 4X,500 people in over 40 countries .... COrtlS shares are listed on the London,
New York and Amsterdam stock exchanges. eorus was crcated in October 1999 Ihrough
the merger of Brilish Sleel and Koninklijke Hoogovens.
hltp:J!www.corusgroup.com!ellicompan}..aboul corusl (last \' isited iv'lar. 26, 2(05).

30 / d.
31 According to 19 U.S.c. ~~ 1673(1), 1677(35), Ihe Commerce Department is required to
determine whelhcr imporled merchandisc is being or is likely to be sold in the United States at less than its fair
value, i.e. the amount by which the price charged Ill!' subjecl merchandise in the home or other comparative
market ("the normal ",due." or "NV") exceeds thc priec charged for subjeci merchandise in Ihe United Siaies
I"the U.S. price").

32 Coms, No. 03-110, slip op. at 2.
33 id. Commerce assessed a dumping duty of 4AX"".
34 id.
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methodology of "zeroing" the imported product was contrary to the obligations
of the U.S. under Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.1 5 If not for the
"zeroing" methodology used by Commerce, Corus would not have been found in
violation of antidumping regulations and would not have been charged a duty)6
That is, if not for the zeroing methodology employed by Commerce, the margin
of dumping would have been de millil11l1s or zeroY
The Commerce Department calculates dumping duties by finding the
ditTerenee between the U.S. price of the impOlied product and the normal price
of the produePx In its calculation, Commerce ignores all negative values (that is,
imports that are sold above the normal value) and only focuses on those imports
that are being sold below the normal value. w This "zeroing" of the non-dumping
values skews the calculation and makes it much easier to find a dumping
violation.

35 Id. S"" also Antidumping Statcment, sl/l'ra notc 13. Article 2.4.2, provides that
in investigations (not rcvicws), national authoritics normally will estahlish dumping margins by
comparing cither:
• a weightcd-avcrage of normal values to a wcightcd-average of cxport priccs of comparable
mcrehandisc: or
• nOl"mal valuc and export price on a transaetion-to-transaetion basis. Where such comparisons
arc inappropriate, howevcr, thc Unitcd States' current methodology is authorizcd. Authorities may
compare a weighted-averagc normal value to individual export transactions. providcd that there is a
pattern of priccs that diners signilicantly and that they explain why a weighted-averagc-toweighted-avcrage or transaetion-to-transaction comparison is not appropriate.

/d.
311 Coms. No. 03-11 n, slip 01'. al 7.
37 1d.
3R Slater Sleeis Corp. v. United Slates, No. 03-162 (Ct. Int'l Trade Dce. 16, 200}).
39 For cxamplc, ifthc "normal price" (i.e. the fair market value of the good) ofa product was $2.0()
and the imported price of the good was $1.75, an antidumping duty of $.25 per good would bc asscssed.
Suppose thcrc werc a bundlc of related or identical goods, with all of thcir "normal prices" at S2.00, half of
which arc sold in Ihe U.S. Itlr S2.25 and half of which arc sold lilr $1.75. Under the melhodology appn)\'cd of
by thc WTO, the net antidumping duty should bc $0.00 (($2.00 - $2.25) I ($2.00 - $1.75)). Under the U.S.
zeroing methodology, hO\vcver, the imported goods sold at $2.25 would be ignored. Consequently, the ncgativc
result ($2.00 - S2.25 ~ -$.25) would not bc used 10 onsct the positivc result ($2.00 - $1.75 = $.25). Thus, the
antidumping duty for the hundle of goods would remain $.25 for every good sold at $1.75.
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Previously, the Court of Intemational Trade had approved of the
Commerce Department's zeroing methodology as a permissible interpretation of
antidumping law. 40 In Serampore Industries, the court acknowledged the
"substantial deference" it gives to "[ Commerce] in both its interpretation of its
statutory mandate and the methods it employs in administering the antidumping
law."4l The court decided that Commerce's interpretation was reasonable because
it "interpreted the statute in such a way as to prevent a foreign producer from
masking its dumping with more profitable sales."42 In Bowe Passa/, the court
acknowledged that the "methodology introduces a statistical bias in the
calculation of dumping margins," but that it was still a reasonable interpretation
of antidumping law because the "statute is silent on the question of zeroing
negative margins" and the methodology was "necessary to combat masked
dumping."4)
Corus, nevertheless, argued that the "zeroing" methodology was illegal
under the Anti-Dumping Agreement:!4 In making this argument Corus relied on
a decision by a panel and an appellate decision in the EC Bed Linen case. 45

40 Seral11porc Indus. Pvt. Ltd. v. U.S. Dq1t of (·oml11erce. 675 F.Supp. 1354, 1361 (Ct. Int'l Trade
19K7).
41 /d. Masked dUl11ping is a species of dumping wherein a cOl11pany sells some products above
market price in order to "mask"' the dumping of products sold bclow cost. In ScriliJ/f!ore, the court simply
accepted Commerce's masked dumping rationale I(lf using a leroing methodology; the court did not scrutinize
the necessity or reasonableness of the methodology. III.
421£1.

43 Bowe Passal Reinigungs-Und Waschereilechnik GMBH v. United States, 926 F.Supp. II3X. 1150
(Ct. Int'I Trade 1996).
44 Corus Eng'g Steels Ltd. v. United States, No. 03-110, slip op. at I (Ct. Int'! Trade Aug. 27, 20(3).
45 Report of the Appellate Body. European Communities -- Antidumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton-Type Bcd Linen li'lll11 India, VvTd)SI41:AB.R (Mar. I. 20(l!). <"aiJable at 2001 WTO LLXIS 13
I hcrcina Iter Fe Bed LiJ/eJ/ \.
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EC Bed Linen, the WTO panel deeided that the European

Community's use of a similar "zeroing" methodology violated the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. 4(,
The Corlls Court declined to apply the WTO panel decision and held
that, despite the WTO panel's decision, Commerce's use of zeroing was
reasonablc,47 and that Commerce was not bound by a WTO panel decision in
applying Congress's implementing legislation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 4x
The court decided against Corus and allowed the antidumping duties to stand.
On February 19, 2004, the European Communities requested that the
WTO establish a panel to review the Corl/S Coul1's deeision. 49 The European
Community has sent two such requests to the WTO requesting a panel. The U.S.
has blocked both of those requests. However, according to the WTO rules, the
third request cannot be blocked by the U.S. Thus, a Panel is nearly certain to be
convened on this issue in the near future. It seems likely that Coms was a test
ease to get the "zeroing" issue before a WTO Panel. This is evident from the lack
of a U.S. federal appeal by eorus. Rather, the European Community is
"appealing" the court's decision with a request to the WTO.
The Corlls Court was not the first court to address and disregard the EC

Bed Linen decision in interpreting antidumping law. The previous year, in
Timken, the court held that it was not dispositive that the zeroing methodology

46 1d .
47 COrl/S, No. 03-110, slip op. at 7.
48 1d.
49 Request for the Establishmcnt of a Pancl by thc Europcan Comlllunities. Uniled SillieS -- Lilli'S,
R<:glllllli(l/ls ,",,1 Melilodologl' jh,. ('lIlel/llIling f)1/1Il1!ing ."I"'gins ("/.emil/g "), WT/DS 294/7·Rcv, I (I'eb, 19,
2(04),
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employed by Commerce was contrary to the WTO decision in the EC Bed Linen
case, because WTO Panel decisions are "non-binding" on the eourPO The court
reasoned that "the ministerial body of the WTO is the only body that can
interpret" a decision by a panel or the appellate body.51 Therefore, the court
reasoned, a WTO panel interpretation of U.S. obligation under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement had no weight in eourt.5 2
Such dismissals of WTO panel decisions are now the norm in
antidumping regulation. This slighting of panel decisions has led to increasing
tension between the actions of the executive branch (the Commerce Department
in particular) and international understanding of U.S. obligations under the AntiDumping Agreement, as evidenced by the WTO dispute resolution system.

III. WilY DON'T U.S. COURTS ApPLY TIlE DECISIONS OF TilE WTO PANEL IN
ANTIDUMPING CASES AGAINST TilE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT?

There are several reasons that U.S. courts do not apply WTO Panel
decisions directly. The most obvious reason is that the implementing legislation
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement expressly forbids its] The next most obvious

50 "This Court does not automatically assume thallhe WTO Panel and Appellate Body decisions are
correct interpretations of United Stales obligations pursuanl to Ihe GATT. Ralher, Ihey arc non-binding
decisions."' Timken Co. v. United Stales, ~4() F. Sllpp. ~d I22X, 1~39 (el. Inl'l Trade 2(02).
51 /d. at 1239n.15.

52 Id. at 1244 ("'Therefore, the Appellate Body's decision in I'('-Bed Linen does not compel a
change to this Court's holding in Bolt,,, Pussu! ... that the Department's zeroing pradice is upheld 'until it
becomes clear that such practice is impermissible."").
53 19 U.S,C, ~ 3512(c)( I) (1994) states:
(I) [N]o person other than (he Uniled States -(A) shall have a cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round
Agreclllen(s or by virtue of congrcssional
appro\'al of such an agreement, or
(B) Illay challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action or
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that the EC Bcd Lincn case was decided between the European

Community and India; the U.S. was not party to the dispute and WTO decisions
do not have a rcsjlldica/a efTect on states not party to a particular dispute. 54
There are, however, more general doctrinal reasons for this judicial
reticence. In general, judicial deference to the executive branch in this area stems
from two principal doctrines of American jurisprudence that have traditionally
supported the United States' dualist approach to intemational law. First, coulis
havc historically deferrcd to the executive in foreign afTairs because the executive
was seen as the political branch best suited to make determinations regarding
foreign relations and international law. There arc at least three principal reasons
for this general foreign affairs deference: 55 (I) the executive branch acts as the
"sole organ" of the United States in foreign afTairs;56 (2) foreign afTairs questions

inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States ... on
the ground that ~lIch action or inaction is inconsistent \vith such an agreement.

Id. Howc\u, this docs not mean the WTO panel decisions arc not important in antidumping disputes in general.
19 U.S.c. ~ 3512(c) clearly docs not allow an independent action based on the Uruguay Rounds agreement. but
it docs not preclude argulllents about the interpretation of the agreements in ordinary antidulllping duty protest
actions. like the underlying cause in ("oms hased on Rule 56.2 of the Court of International Trade. Coms, No.
03-110, slip op. at I See also Roger P. A\t(lI"ll, Federal COllrts. Illternatiollal rrihllilais. al/(I the COli till 1111111 oj
Deter(,IICI!, 43 VA. 1. IN "I. L. 675, 735 n.20R (2003).
54 Slater Steels Corp. v. United States, No. 03-162, slip op. at 6 (el. Int'l Trade Dec. 16,20(3).
55 Curtis Bradley suggested four types of t(lI"eign athlirs defcrence: (I) Political Qucstion
Deference: (2) ExeclItivc Branch Lawmaking Deference: (3) International Facts Deferencc: (4) Persuasiveness
Deferencc: and (5) Chevron Deference. Curtis A. Bradley, (,hel'I"OI1 LJeji'rellcc alld Foreigll .1t/airs, 86 VA. L.
Rrv. 649, 659663 (2000). Jonathan Charney idcntitied eight reasons I(Jrjudicial deference in foreign rclations:
(I) International law may not be "Iaw" in domestic setting: (2) the need for an independent judiciary: (3) the
exccutiyc's expertise in internationalla\\': (4) ex<:cutive access to bcts particular to /(lreign altairs: (5) the alien
quality of international law: (C» uncertainty of clfeets in foreign affairs decisions: (7) the need for a sole voice
in /()l'eign athlirs: and (X) the need for cxecutiye flexibility in t(lreign afbirs. Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial
/Jeti:r,,"('e ill Foreigil Re/aliol1l, XJ A~1. J. I" r'1 L. H05, XOX R12 (I 'IX'!). This author has condensed the list to
three, incorporating ,til of the relevant bctors to the judicial deference at issue: conllict between WTO panel
decisions and executive regulations in antidumping.

56 See discussion illtm Part III.A.I.
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tend to be policy-based and political rather than legal;'i7 and (3) executive
expertise and specialized knowledge are better suited to foreign a t1'a irs
questions.'iX
The second reason for judicial reluctance to use WTO panel decisions to
invalidate executive branch interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agrcement is the

Chevroll doctrine. 50 According to this doctrine, courts, in celiain circumstances,
give the administrative agencies (like the Commerce Department) broad
discretion in inteqJreting and implementing ambiguous legislation, including
treaties. This broad discretion granted by courts sometimes comes into opposition
with an interpretative canon, the Charming

BeL~y,

which encourages coulis to

avoid an interpretation of an ambiguous statute that would violate international
law. The potential conflict arises when an agency interprets a statute contrary to
the decision of an international tribunal, like the WTO panel. This has led to
increasing tensions between international law and domestic law; Coms is the
latest example of this tension in the context of antidumping law.
Various approaches have been recommended to alleviate this apparent
incongruity of international and domestic law. On one extreme, some commentators advocate a "rule of law" approach that would give judges complcte
discretion to decide "what the law is," and then apply the decisions of internationa I tribunals so as to harmonize domestic law with international obligations. 60

57 See discu"ion illti"" Part III.A.2.
Sg See discussion ill/m Part III.AJ.
5<) Set'

Jiocussion illtm Part 111.13.

60 See disclission illti·" Part 1VA.
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On the other extreme, some recommend a judicial "hands-off' approach to
foreign affairs: encouraging courts to avoid any attempt to contradict the
executive branch in foreign affairs. 61 This appears to be close to the approach
taken by courts recently in antidumping law decisions.(,2 The Court of
International Trade, for example, mentions the EC Bed Lillell case and then
proceeds to completely disregard it in favor of an executive interpretation of
antidumping law. h )
This author recommends an approach(,4 between the two extremes:
executive implementation of ambiguous treaties should be granted substantial
deference, but decisions by an international tribunal should be significant
evidence of the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation. Under the
recommended approach, a WTO panel decision, such as EC Bed Linell, would
not control a court's decision; rather, it would set up a presumption of unreasonableness against a contrary executive interpretation of antidumping law. Such a
presumption could be rebutted, but it would require more than mere assertion of
a policy concern

~

it would require proof of an overriding executive interest in

acting contrary to a WTO panel decision.

61 S~I! discussion ill/i-II Part IVB.
62 Slatcr Stcels Corp. v. United States. No. 03-1 (,2. slip op. at 5 6 (Ct. Int'I Tradc Dcc. 16,20(3):
('orus Eng'g Steels Ltd. v. United States. No. 03-110. slip op. at 7 (Ct. Int'I Trade Aug. 27. 20(3): Timken Co.
\. United States. 240 F. Supp. 2d 122X. 1239 (Ct. Int'l Tradc 20(2).
63 Iri. In ."/a/er. the Court summarily dismissed thc /,'C B~rI LiIlOI case as inapplicable to thc United
States. No. 03-1 (12. slip op, at 6. The court was correct in noting that \VTO Pancl dccisions lack shirl! d('cisis
ctlcct and the United States vvas not a party (and thus, not hound). However, the S/II/cr court, along with the
courts in ('OrtiS and TimkclI. hliled to discuss thc merits and reasoning of the F:C Bed Lillen case.

64 See discussion ill/i'l/ Part IV.C.
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A. Political Question Deference
Generally, the judiciary grants significant deference to the executive in
foreign affairs because the executive branch, as opposed to the judicial branch, is
uniquely suited to act in the realm offoreign affairs. This division oflabor among
the branches of government may loosely be termed a version of the political
question doctrine.!» When confronted with a political qucstion, a court will
generally avoid contradicting the political branch of government. The political
question doctrine is not an absolute bar to judicial action. Rather, courts will
balance the potential effects of judicial action with the reasons why the executive
branch alone is competent to act. 66 Three arguments favor the executive branch's
competence to act alone: ( I ) the executive is the "sole organ" or sole voice of the
United States; (2) foreign affairs questions tend to be policy-based and political
rather than legal; and (3) executive expertise and specialized knowledge are
better suited to foreign affairs questions.
Before assessing these arguments, it

IS

useful to note that there is a

distinction between non-justiciable political questions and those political
questions that are justiciable, but the judiciary defers to the judgment of the
executive branch. One authority notes:

65 "Political-question doctrine: The judicial principle that a court should refuse to decide an issue
involving the exercise of discretionary power by the executive or legislative branch of government.·· BL'VlJ-;'S
LAW DllliUNARV 1179 (7th cd. 1999). Set! a/so 16 l'.J.S. COI/.\lillllioll(f/ Lilt" ~ 176 (2004) ("Except to the extent
that such power is conferred on the courts by constitutional or statutory provisions. it is not within the province
of the judiciary to detcrmine political questions.").
66 [lIt is error to suppose thai every case or controversy which touches foreign relations
lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field seelll invariably to show a
discriminating analysis of the pal1icular question posed. in terms of the history of its
management by the political branches. "fits susceptibility to judicial handling in the light
of its nature and posture in the specific case. and oflhe possible consequences ofiudicial
action.
Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. I g6. 211 212 (1962).
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[The political question] label docs not necessarily mean that the issue is
considered nonjusticiablc. Instead, in many political question cases,
courts are simply holding that the President's decision was within his
authority and thercft)re law for the courts. (,7

1. The Executive acts as the "sole orga 11 " or sole voice oflhe United States ill
fhreigll afrairs

Proponents of this justification would point to the solidarity required in
international negotiations in general and in trade negotiations in particular. The
seminal case presenting this position is Curtiss-Wright. 6x In Curtiss-Wright, the
court recognized that
if, 111 the maintenance of our international relations,
embarrassment-perhaps serioLis embarrassment-is to be
avo'ided and sLiccess for our aims achieved, congressional
legislation which is to be made ctTective through negotiation and
inquiry within the international field must often accord to the
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs
alone involvedYi
Since then, courts have been reluctant to disturb the actions of the
executive in the international arcna. 70 This judicial reticence includes questions

67 Bradley. slIl,m note 55 at 660. Bradley continues:
For example. the Suprellle Court has labeled as "political" the issue of whether. after a
change of conditions, a foreign nation continues to remain a parly to a treaty, hut the

Court has not treated the i"ue as Iloll-justiciable: rather. it has accepted as legally binding
the executive branch's determination of the issue. Nevertheless. there arc instances of
non-justiciable political questions in the foreign atlllirs area. especially in the lower
courts. Indeed. although this "pure" version of the political question doctrine has waned
substantially in recent years as a general matter. it still appears to have sOllle t']fee in the
t(Jfcign athlirs area.

Id.
6R United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp .. 299 US. 304 (1936).
69 Id. at 320.

70 ",Tlhe courts traditionally refrain li'om disturbing 'the very delicate. plenary and exclusive power
of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the tieltl of tClreign relations.· .. Footwear Distrib.
& Retailers of Am. v. United States. R52 F Supp. l07g. IOl)6 (Ct. Inri Trade 1994) (quoting Curtiss-Wright.
299 U.S at 320).
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of international trade.?! In Federal Mogul, the court recognized that "[t]rade
policy is an increasingly important aspect of foreign policy, an area in which the
executive branch is traditionally accorded considerable deference."n The court
stressed the political f1exibility required for an administrative agency to interpret
and implement foreign trade law.?' However, the court seemed to contradict itself
by stating that "[a]ntidumping dutics arc not simply tools to be deployed or
withheld in the conduct of domcstic or forcign policy."74 In the end, the court
concluded that despite the neutral purpose of antidumping duties, "[tlor the Court
of International Trade to read a GATT violation into the statute, over Commerce's
objection, may commingle powers bcst kept separate."7) In other words, the court
followed the traditional "sole-voice" approach and declined to pass judgment on
the actions of an administrativc agcncy engaged in international rclations.
The executive branch, however, including its constitutive administrative
agencies, is not thc "sole organ" of intcrnational trade regulation. Generally, there
arc the obvious examples of commingling of foreign affairs power, such as the
Senate's participation in the Executive's treaty making power 76 and Congress'
constitutional prerogative to regulate international commerce, dcclare war on
foreign states, and define violations of the law of nations. 77 In particular,

71 S"" Fed. Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 15XI (Fed Cir. 1'1'15).
72 Iii.

13M

74 id.
75 1<1. at ISll2.
76 "IThe Executivel shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate. to make
Treaties. provided t\\O thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S. CONS!. art. II, ~ 2, ,I. 2.
77 Congress has constitutional authority to regulate commerce, dctine offenses against the law of
nations, and declare war. U.S. Co", I. art. I, ~ X, el. 2. 10, II.
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Congress is granted constitutional authority over the imposition of duties and
tari ffs. 7X Pursuant to this power, Congress has instructed the Trade Administration
to consult with the appropriate congressional committee when deciding whether
to alter existing procedures or policies in reaction to an adverse WTO panel
report. 7')
The "sole organ" consideration ignores strong policies supported by the
Anti-Dumping Agreement; therefore, it does not justify judicial ignorance of the
GATT Antidumping and Subsidy Codes xo and the opinions of the intemational
tribunals instituted to adjudicate disputes about obligations under GATT. Indeed,
GATT and the Anti-Dumping Agreement are intemational attempts to establish a
fair playing field xl with clcar guidelines, an attempt that Congress endorsed by
signing the GATT Agreement. x2 Clear congressional endorsement of an intemational body would belie the notion that the executive branch is the only political
branch of the govemment whose will is represented by U.S. participation in
intemational trade.

n

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Dulies on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's
inspcction Laws: and the nct Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on
Imports or Fxports, shall be for Ihe Usc of the Treasury of the United States: and all such
Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Conlrol of the Congress.
U.S C()to;SI. arl. I. ~ 10. cl. 2.
79 19 lJ.S.c. ~ 3533. entitled "Dispute Settlement Panels and Procedures." instructs that \I hen ""
dispute settlement panet or the Appellate Body tlnels in its report that a regulation or practice of a dep'lrtment
or agency of the United States is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements," the Trade
Representative must consult with ··the appropriate congressional committees" and "private sector advisory
committees" before amending any policies or procedures. ~ 3533(g).
XO Fundicao Tupy S.A. v. United States, (,52 F. Supp. 153X, 1543

«'I. Int'l Trade

1987).

XI See Fed. Mogul Corp. v. United States, (,3 F.3d 1572, 15XO (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Antidumping
jurisprudence seeks to be !ilir. rather than to build bias into the calculation of dumping margins.").

82 See gelleraiir Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-4(,5, lOR Stat. 4R09 (1994).
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2. Foreign a/fc/irs questions tend to he po/icy-hased and political rather thall
legal
Courts are also reluctant to question a politically accountable branch of
government regarding matters of policy. While it is admitted that the judiciary is
the final voice when it comes to legal questions, policy questions are best left to
the executive and legislative branches as those branehcs which are closer to the
people. This policy argument seems especially pronounced regarding WTO
decisions.
Antidumping and taritTs generally are politically sensitive and policyintense areas of decision-making. Proponents of this view would cite the
domestic responses to the WTO panel's decision, in November, 2003, that U.S.
steel tariffs were illegal, clearing the way for the European Union to impose $2
billion of sanctions unless the U.S. abandons the duties. X} The Bush administration and some members of Congress discredited the panel's decision and
contemplated ignoring it altogether. x4 On the other side, some pundits argued that
the U.S. should respect the decision because the political eost of undercutting the
WTO outweighs the benefit of ignoring its ruling. x5 It seems that a court might
view the whole issue of responding to a WTO panel decision as a question of
policy rather than law. Such a view was adopted by the court in Corus. X6 Some

83 Elizabeth Becker. US Tilrij/.'
November II, 2003, at i\ I.

Oil

S!l!ei arl! !/legal, /II"'1i1 Tmlil! (),gOlli~o!ioll San. N.Y. TI~IFS,

84 Jd.
85 Iii . .'leI! a/so Thomas Crampton, Jopal/ allil E. U. Thrm!uI

u.s.

(11/

Illlp"r! SOl/clioll,\', N. Y.

TIMES,

November II, 2003 at i\ I.
Sh eorus Eng'g Steels Ltd. v. United States, No. 03-110, ,lip op. at 7 «('t. Inl'l Trade Aug. 27, 20(3).
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courts have accepted u blanket stutement of such policy-based deference in
antidumping

Iaw.~7

Judicial abdication based on such a sweeping policy-based characterization of tariff and antidumping law is flawed. Many court decisions touch on
questions that policy makers are vitally interested in. Additionally, a political
branch has spoken on this subject; the policy of the U.S. has been announced by
the joining of an international organization dedicated to the harmonization of
trade practices. Prior to the Uruguay round, a court noted that "when Congress
enacted the Trade and Tariff Act, it reaffirmed its intention to maintain the consistency of United States laws." In addition, the establishment of an independent
governmental agency, the Trade Administration, to implement the Anti-Dumping
Agreement further evidences U.S. commitment to a non-policy-based
enforcement of the Agreement. As the Federal Mogul Court admitted,
the independent status of the International Trade Commission was
intended to insulate the Government's decision to impose antidumping
duties from narrowly political concerns. XX
There simply is not enough room for the executive to promulgate a policy that
would undermine the stability of an international regime that Congress has
endorsed. Consequently, the Commerce Department's interpretation of pennissible antidumping regulation contrary to U.S. treaty obligations, as evidenced by

R7 Fl'Il. ,HoglIl. ()3 F3d at 15S2. ("Commerce is due judicial deference in part because of its
established expertise in administration of the Act, and in part beeausc of 'the foreign policy repercussions of a
dumping dctermination. '''): Smith-Corona Group \" United Statcs, 713 F.2d 15hS. 1571 (I st Cir. 19R3) ("'[TIlle
foreign policy repercussions of a dumping deterl11ination. . makes the enforcement of the antidumping law a
ditTieult and supremely delicate endeavor.").

XX h3 F.3d at 15S I.
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an intemational tribunal's decisions, should not be endorsed as a policy-based
decision.
3. Executive e.\pel'tise alld speciali::.ed knowledge (Ire better sllited to ./c)l'cign
(!ltc/irs questiolls

Administrative agenCIes are often pnvy to a significant amount of
information regarding foreign affairs that are not available to the judiciary.
Consequently, judges may be reluctant to question the political branch that seems
to have all of the answers. X!) This executive expertise seems to fall into two
groups. First, the employees and agents of the Trade Administration have signifieantly more experience dealing with the intricacies of intemational trade than an
average federal judge. A judge may be uncomfortable adventuring into such an
"alien" area of law and facts. Second, much information is simply not available
to the judge from an appropriate domestic source of information. In the pursuit
of relevant information, a judge may find hcrself delving into sensitive
diplomatic issues outside the traditional scope of judicial scrutiny. In the area of
antidumping cases, a federal judge may decline to impose her judgment because
the Trade Administration is the expert in this area and the judge lacks etTective or
appropriate access to information that would rebut the administration's findings.

X9 Jonathan Charney of Vanderbilt Univer,ity noted that:
into international law are onen episodic. Judges may consider themselves
ill-equipped to decide any such quc,tions placed heforc thcm. For example. treaties are
negotiated in international forums whose rccords may be unfamiliar. The sources of
cu,tomary internationall'l\\ arc ,imilariy untLulliliar. Some dome,tic judge, would pretcr
to rely upon the view, of the executive branch, which h,,, expertise ill these matters.
Charney, slIl'ra note 55, at ~()9.

Ie Jourt forays
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This argument is curious because it belies one of the key features of
American jurisprudence: the parties are the agents of discovery, not the judge.
Also, the executive presumably does not enjoy an absolute monopoly on
knowledge of the application of international trade law. In Co rl/S , the defending
party hired competent and knowledgeable counsel, experts in international
antidumping law. Further, there are other organizations with significant interest
in the application of antidumping law that might provide guidance and expertise.
The WTO employs highly qualified staff and enjoys access to all of the
information necessary to make the determinations.
Regarding access to sensitive diplomatic information, this concern
makes little sense when applied to antidumping law. The law has been codified
by Congress in the context of an international agreement. Though the Executive
certainly is privy to an administration's goals in implementing the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, Congress has endorsed the promotion of a consistent international
regime. Therefore, it seems unlikely, though possible, that the Trade
Administration would be privy to diplomatic information that would dispute the
need for a transparent and internationally harmonious application of the
agreement. As with the question of policy, any diplomatic information that would
undermine the integrity of an international regime endorsed by Congress should
be given little weight in the abstract. In other words, absent clear indication of
specific information or sources of information that the Executive alone is privy
to, a cOUli should be reluctant to refuse review based on the speculative
possibility of such information.
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B. Chevron Dej"erellce, the Channing Betsy Canon, and Their Conflict
Under the Chevron doctrine, courts typically grant deference to the
executive branch in detel111ining the application of some statutes. However, in the
arena of foreign atTairs and treaties, another doctrine, the Charming Betsy
interpretive canon, may trump the Chevron doctrine. The Charming Bet.\y canon
holds that when a statute is ambiguous, a court ought to interpret so as not to
violate international law. But the contlict ofWTO panel decisions with executive
determinations takes place one step removed from the traditional conflict. The
nature of WTO panel decisions adds a complication to the ordinary tension
between the two doctrines.

I. The Chevron doctrine
In general, the Chevron doctrine permits a court to grant substantial
deference in the interpretation of a statute. However, this doctrine may be
trumped by the Charming Bels\" canon of interpretation. This conflict has special
significance to interpretation of antidumping law because Congress has not
specified the methodology (whether zeroing or another methodology), and the
WTO has spoken on the impermissibility of zeroing under GATT.
In Chevron, the Supreme Court set out the "Chevron test":
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
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Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a pennissible construction of the statute. 90
The Court set up a two prong test for judicial interpreting of legislation,
including treaties and statutes: (1) Docs the statute or treaty specifically require
a particular interpretation? If it does, then the court must apply the statute as
explicitly required; (2) If the statute or treaty is ambiguous, is the interpretation
of the legislation by an administrative agency permissible? If so, then the court
must "defer, even if it would have come to quite a different view ifleft to its own
devices.",!1 One court noted:
The court need not conclude that the agency's construction is the only
reasonable one, or that it would have reached that result had the question
aris-cn before it in the first instance.'Il
In the case of CorllS, the court first determined that the implementing legislation
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement did not specify how antidumping duties should
be levied.'I3 Then the court afforded great deference to the interpretation of the
Trade Administration in using the zeroing mcthodology.94
90 CIIl'\"""'. 467 U.S. al R42 ~43. Inlhe eonlext ofanlidlllllping law. the CIIl'\""(J/1 doelrine requires
a courl to "sustain ('om mcree's determinations unless they arc 'unsupported by substantial evidence on the
record, or otherwise not in accordance with law ... · Slater Steels Corp. v. United States. No. 03-162. slip 01'. at
I (CI. Int'! Trade Dec. I h. 20(3) (qw,ting I') L.Se ~ I" I hai b)( I )( H)). "Under CII('\'r!J/I, it is only if the ('ourt
concludes that 'Congress either had no intent on the matter. or that ('ongress's purpose and intent regarding the
matter is ultimately unclear: that the Court will defer to Commerce's construction." !d (quoting Timex VI.,
Inc. v. United States, 157 F.3d R79, ~RI (Fed. Cir.19(8)).

91 ('ont'l Air Lines v. Dep't ofTransp., 843 F2d 1444, 1449 (D.c. Cir. 1988).
92 Footwear Distrib. & Retailers of Am. v. linited States, 852 r. Supp. IOn, 1089 (CI. Inl'l Trade
1994). Sl'(, IIlso Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443,450 (197X): Udall \. Tallman, 380 U.S. I,
16 (1965).
93 The COI'llS Court noted that "I b lecause the antidumping statutes arc silent regarding the treatment
of negative margins. the practice of zeroing has becn challcnged a number of times in different contexts." Corus
I'ng'g Steels l.ld. \. United Slates, No. 03-110. slip op. at 17 tel. Int'I Trade i\u~. 27. 20(3).
94 Relying on preecllcnt, the court held that Commerec's intcrprelation of anlidumping legislation
was reasonablc because it pre\'Cnted ""masked dumping." Id. Sl'(, (Ilso Serampore Indus. Pvl. Ltd. v. U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, 675 F.Supp. 1354, 1360-61 (el. Inri Trade 19X7): Bowc Passat Reinigungs-Und
Wascherciteehnik GMBH v. Uniled States, 92(' F.Supp. II3X. 1150 (et. Inl'l Trade 1996): Timken Co. v.
United States, 240 F. Supp. 2d 122X, 1243 44 (CI. Inri Tradc 20(2).
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At least one scholar has advocated a Chcvroll deference approach to
judicial review of executive application of international law,'!5 including treaties
and their executing legislation. 96 Curtis Bradley suggested a Chcvron approach to
judicial defcrcnce to the executive in the international arena. This approach is
certainly attractive. It would add consistency and coherence to the analysis of this
question because it would adopt a well established doctrine in an area of
uncertain precedent. For the purposes of this section, this author will assume that
a federal district court'!7 would apply a ChcI'I'OIl-like approach to the question
before us, namely, should a decision by the Department of Commerce be scrutinized using a WTO panel decision?
The Anti-Dumping Agreement was incorporated into U.S. law. YX The
statute docs not specify which methodology must be used to calculate
antidumping duties. 99 The question then becomes whether Commerce permis-

95 Bradley, slIpra note 55 at 651 652. Curtis Bradley proposed that courts should apply a general
CIWI'roll deference to executive branch decisions in I(lreign alfairs. He argued that l11uch could be gained

by considering foreign aihlirs law Irom the perspective of the Che\T(ln doctrine in
administrative law. Under this doctrine, courts will defer to an agency's interpretation of
an ambiguous statute if the agency has been charged with administning the statutc and
the agency's interpretation is based on a "permissible" reading of the statute.
!d.

96 Sumitol11o Shoji AI11 .. Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, I X4 X5 (I n2); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366
U.S. I X7, 194 (1961). See also Rlcs 1;lT~lU' 1 (Tll]](ll) Ol FORll(;'1 RHAll()CJS ~326(2) (19X7) ("Courts. . will
give great weight to an interpretation made by the Executive Branch."); 1'1 AI lsI'. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng. 525
U.S. 155, 167 (1999); Factor v. Laubenheimer. 290 U.S. 276. 295 (1933); Demjanjuk v'. Pctrovsky. 776 F.2d
571, 579 (6th Cir. 19X5) (stating that the executive branch's "logical reading" of a treaty "is entitled to considerable deference").
97 The Court of International Trade recently adopted this approach in re\'iewing Commerce's
antidumping regulations. Slater Steels Corp. v. United States, No. 03-162. slip op. at I (Cl.lnt"! Trade Dec. 16,
20(3).
9X 19 U.s.c. ~ 1671 (2005)

('I.

se'l.

99 19 U.s.c. ~ 1673(2) (1994), which states:

If -(2) the lTrade Administration I determines that
(A) an industry in the United ,tate,
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded,
by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of ,ales (or the likelihood of sales) of that
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sibly interpreted the statute. Congress has entrusted the application of the AntiDumping Agreement and its executing domestic law to Commerce and,

111

particular, the Trade Administration.
Evcn if a court concluded that Commerce's interpretation of the AntiDumping Agrccment was questionable, a court still may grant discretion because
of the Executive Branch's implied authority over foreign affairs legislation.
Because Congress typically grants the Executive Branch power to implement
international trade law, any administrative provision touching on it might be
shielded by foreign affairs deference.
supplementary category of deference in

The Supreme Court recognized this

u.s.

v. Mead Corp.:

Congress . . . may not have expressly delegated authority or
responsibility to implement a particular provision or fill a
particular gap. Yet it can still be apparcnt from the agency's
generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances
that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with
the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills
a space in the enacted law, even one about which "Congress did
not actually have an intent" as to a particular result. When
cirClIlIlstances imp~\'ing slich all expectation exist, a reviewing
court has IlO husilless rejecting all age/1(~V :s' exercise oj" its
generally conj"erred authority to resolve a particular statutory
ambiguity simply because the agency's chosen resolution seems
unwise, but is obliged to accept the agency's position if Congress
has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency's
interpretation is reasonable. [1111
Thus, the ChCl'l"OlI doctrine may otTer separate grounds, other than
foreign affairs deference, for executive dominance in the realm of foreign affairs.
mcrchandisc tll[ importation, thcn there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping
duty.
Id. Thc tcxt of the statute itsclf docs not specify how the Trade Administration should "dctcrmine" such injury.
Courts hav·e notcd that the statutory language is silent as [0 the mcthodology to be adoptcd in assessing
antidumping duties. See. e.g .. B{JlI'e PasSi/!. 92C> 1'. Supp. at 1150 (""Thc statute is silcnt on the question of
zcroing negative margins."); Scram!,or", (,75 F. Supp. at 13nO ("A plain rcading of the statutc discloses no
provision tllr Commcrcc to otlset salcs madc at LTFV with salcs madc at fair valuc.").
100 533 U.S. 21X, 229 (2001) (citations omittcd & cmphasis addcd).
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However, this doctrine loscs some of its strength when held up next to a
sometimes competing doctrine: the preference for avoiding violation of intemational law in judicial interpretation of congressional enactments.

2. The Charming Betsy may trump Chevron
COUl1s hesitate to apply the Chevron doctrine directly if the administrative agency's interpretation of the statute would violate U.S. obligations in
international law. The Charming BeL), canon acts as a braking mechanism on the
broad application of U.S. law in the international arena. Simply stated, the

Charming Betsy canon statcs that "an act ofCongrcss ought ncvcr to bc construcd
to violate thc law of nations if any other possible construction remains."lol The
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations states the rule thus: "Where fairly
possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to connict with
intcrnational law or with an international agrccmcnt of thc United Statcs."11I2
The Charming BeLlY is not a substantive application of international law,
though some would advocate such a use. IO .1 Rather, the Charming Betsy canon is
an interpretative tool. Congress may choose to violate international law, whether

101 Murray v. Schooncr Charming Bctsy, (, U.S. 64, II X ( I X(4). Thc Suprcmc Court abo stakd:
lAin act ofCongrcss ought ncvcr to bc construcd to violalc thc law of nations ifany othcr
possiblc construction rcmains, and, conscqucntly can ncvcr bc construcd to violatc
ncutral rights, or to atfect neutral commerec, further than is warranted by the law of
nations as undcrstood in this country.

ld
102

RISI\lcMLNT (TllIRD) ()I

F()I{l'I(;~

RtLMI()NS

~ 114 (19X7).

103 Curtis A. Bradley, The Channing Betsy CIIIIOII IIlId SCl'lIratioll o! 1'0\1'('1'.1'.' Rethillkillg tile
III/!!Il)!'!!/i,·" Ro/e ollll/e/'l/II/iollll/ Lill', X6 GIO. L..I. 479, 4lJX (199X). Though hc di"'grccs "ith thc vic\\',
Bradley note, that:
Is lomc judgcs and commcntators ... I havc I argucd for what could bc called an "intcrnationalist conception" of the canon. In esscncc, this conccption vicws thc canon as a
mcans of supplcmcnting U.S. law and contlmning it to thc contours of intcrnalional law
Undcr this vicw, courts should usc thc canon not primarily to implcmcnt legislativc
intcnt, but rather to make it harder tllr Congress to violate intcrnational law, and to
t'lcilitate U.S. implcmcntation of international law.
Id.
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the international norm is established by treatylf14 or customary international
law. lOS "The Charming Bet.,)" canon does not apply when the reach of a statute is
clear."IO(, As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stated, a judge's "duty is to
enforce the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, not to conform
the law of the land to norms of customary international law."lo7 In other words,
Congress may violate international law, but courts will presume that Congress
did not intend such a violation absent clear legislative intent.

It is useful to note the historical context of the Charming Betsy decision.
Curtis Bradley noted that Charming Bets.\' was decided in an era very different
fi'om the CUITent one. IOX He pointed out three principal distinctions between the
world of Charming Bet,), and our own. First, the U.S. was a f1edgling state, eager
to avoid war with the more powerful international actors. I09 The Court
recognized that it was in the nation's best interest not to unnecessarily interpret
statutes so as to antagonize more powerful European states. Second, at the
104 SI!I! Brcard v. Greene. 523 U.S. 371.376 (199R); Ping v. Uniled States. 130 U.S. SRI. 600
( I SX9); Whitney v. Robertson. 124 U.S. 190. 194 ( I XXX); Fdye v. Robertson. 112 U.S. 5XO, 597 ( I XS4).
105 SI!C e.g., (jalo-Garcia \. Immigration & Naturalization Sen'., XC> F.3d 916, 91 X (9th Cir. 19(6);
United States v. Yunis.lJ24 F.ld 10Xr" 1091 (D.C. Cir. 19(1); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 7XX F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th
Cir.). cert. dellied, 575 U.S. 1022 ( 19R6); The Paquete Ilabana, 175 U.S. (177, 700 ( 19(0).

106 Curtis A. Bradley, [lll/I'iT,wl Jurisdictiol/ alld u.s LillI', 20(JI U. CIIIC. U(iAL F. 323, 332
(200 I). SI!I! also nil/is, 924 F.2d at 1091; (iarciil-Mir, 7XS F.2d at 1453; Comrn. of U.S. Citizens Living in Niear.
v. Reag<lIl, X59 F.2d 929. 93X (D.C. Cir. 19RX) ("Statutes inconsistent with principles of customary international
law may well lead to international law violations. But within the d01llestic legal realm, that inconsistent statute
simply modities or supersedcs customary international law to the ex lent of the inconsistency."); Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mollsson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1323 (D.C'. Cir.19W) (U.S. cOllrts arc
"obligated to gi\'c ctle<:t to an unamhiguous exercise by ('ongress of its jurisdiction to prescribe eyen if ~uch an
exercise \VOllld exceed the limitations imposed by international la\\',").
107 limis. 924 F2d at 1091. See "Iso Reed v. Wiser, 555 E2d 1079, 1093 (C'.A.N.Y. 1(77).
lOX Bradley, Charllling Betsy ('(///(1/1. Sill}/'(! note 103, at 491 492 (Bradley examincd the "contelllporary validity of thc ('harming Bets\' canon" and poinled out that "it Illay be useful to consider first the
historical contcxt of its adoption." He criticized the blind usc of the canon without "considering the context in
which the 'canon' w,asJmade.").
109 I". at 492 (The "Supreme Court was undoubtedly aware," when Chwmillg Bels.!' was decided,
that ·'the U.S. government had a strong desire to avoid violations of inlcrnationallaw, largely due to a fear that
a violation Illight embroil the United States in a military conflict.").
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beginning of the nineteenth century, international law was commonly used as a
kind of federal common law. 111I Therefore, the commonly accepted canon of
preferring interpretations of statutes that do not contradict the common law
supp011ed a similar preference when it came to international law. I II Finally,
Bradley points out that, at the time of Justice Marshall, "international law ... was
widely considered to be objective and discoverable ... due in part to international
law's association with natural law."112 Because international law was seen as
"founded on the great and immutable principles of equity and natural justice,"113
it could be "deducible by natural rcason."114
Times have changed. No longer a quaking, fledgling nation, the United
States is the preeminent military superpower of the world. Federal common law
was expressly rejected in Erie. IIS Finally, since Justice Holmes and the realist
revolution, mainstream American jurisprudence has jettisoned natural law as a

110 Id. at 493 (.. ( 'ourls in the ninetccnth century treated Icustomary international law I ,., part of the
'general common law. "'). s~c "Iso Arthur M. Wei,burd, Till' I:\('clllin' Bmllch aI/(/ 11I1~mOli()/liI/ LillI', 41 VA~IJ.
L. RFY. 1205, 1211 1214 (IngJ; William A. Fletcher, Til<' (j('IJem/ COIIIIIIOII I,({\\' olld !:iccliol1 34 of Ihe
Jlldiciorl' Act of 171\£): nil' Exwllp/c o(Maril1c IlISlImllcc, 97 HAR\,. L. RE\,. 1513, 1527 3X ( 19S4); Stewart Jay,
Origills o(Fedi'm/ COIIIIIIOII Lol\'.· Purl Tm), 133 U. PA. l.. RI·\,. 1231, 1263 65 (19~5). These articles aid
understanding of the relationship between customary international law and the evolution of federal common
law. These articles were all referenced by Bradley in his article. Bradley, Channing Betsy COli 011 , slIpm note
103, at 492 n.75.
III Bradley, Charming Betsy ('UIJ(!II, slIpm note 103. at 492.
112 Id. at 494.

113 The Venus, 12 U.S. 253, 297 (1~14) (Marshall, concurring).
114 Bradley, Charming Betsy ('OIlOIl, s{{l'ra note 103, at 510 (quoting Blackstone who declared that
universal principles were "deducible by natural reason," and that they "result Irolll those principles of natural
justice, in which all the learned of every nation agrec"J. Sec 4 \VIIII~\\1 BI.\ch:sIONI', COhHdl'<rARllcs 66 67
( 179G).
115 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 7X (llJ3X) states:
Except in mallers governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress. the law
to be applied in any case is the law of the ,tate. And whether the law of the state ,hall be
declared by its Legislature in a statute or by it, highest court in a decisilln is not a maller
of federal concern. There is 1I0/(,(/CI'<I/ gelleml COIIIIIIOII /({\t'.
(emphasis added).
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general doctrinal principle, 11(, Justice Holmes rejected the idea of a discoverable,
objective body of natural law:
It is vcry hard to resist the impression that there is one august
corpus, to understand which clearly is the only task of any Court
concerned, If there were such a transcendental body of law
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and
until changed by statute, the Courts of the United States might be
right in using their independent judgment as to what it was, But
there is no such body of law, The fallacy and illusion that I think
exist consist in supposing that there is this outside thing to be
found,117
International law was thereby finnly distinguished and distaneed from domestic
law in the United States,
In Iight of these considerations, Bradley suggested a reassessment of the
continuing relevance of the Charming

Bet\~\'

doctrine, He rejected characterizing

the doctrine as either a fiction of implied legislative intent llX or a substantive
application of international law, 119 He came to the conclusion that the Charming

Bet,sy doctrine should be viewed as

II () The Co uri in D'ic, concluded that the practice of the federal courts in developing their o\\'n
general common law rested on a hillacy. This fallacy involved the assumption, in the words of .lust ice Holmes,
that "therc is 'a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and
until changed by statute. ", Bradley, Charming Betsy ('([I/IJ/I, .IIII'm note 103, at 514.
117 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S.
51X,533 (192X).
II R Bradley, Charming Betsy ('111/01/, .IIII'm note 103, at 495, 51 X. Among Bradley's criticisms of
implying an '"internationally law-abiding character" to ('ongrcss was the significant empirical evidence that
contradicts stich an asslimption. Id Bradley argues thai "'an intent-based account of the ('harming B(!I.,y canon
\"ould have to confront prublcnwtic empirical evidcnce suggesting that compliance with international law is
onen not the political branches' paramount concern." Id. He points to some examples: The recent Helms-Burton
Act, thc Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, and "the htilure by Congress during the last several years to authorizc timcly
paymcnt of United States dues to the United Nations." Id.
119 Id. at 523. The "Internationalist Conception," as Bradley sees it, would dictate that a court
'" construe I a statute broadly to mirror international law, even if such a construction is not necessary in order to
avoid a \·iolation of international law." III. at 499. "The internationalist conception is closely identified with the
view that customary international law is an independent source of law liJr U.S. courts." Id. Among his criticisms
of this view, Bradley points out that evidence of willingness on the part of the political branches to violate
international law "also undermines the internationalist conception of the canon." Id. at 523. He argues that
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a means of both respeeting the formal constitutional roles of
Congress and the President and preserving a proper balance and
harmonious working relationship among the three branches of
the federal government. 120
While this eomment neither accepts nor rejects Bradley's conclusions,
his explanation of the evolution of the Charming Bets), doctrine is important to
its application to WTO deeisions. Specifically, such considerations regarding the

Charming Bet!',)' canon play an important role in rejecting the two extremist
approaches (the "rule of law" or the "judicial hands-oft" approaches) and
accepting a moderate third approach to the current tension between the Charming

Betsy and the Chevron doctrines when opinions by the domestic administrative
agencies contlict with the decisions of a foreign WTO panel.
More generally, Bradley's observations underscore the modern relevance
of the doctrine as a judicial tool of non-involvement. In other words, courts may
justifiably use the canon in order to keep out of fights between the executive and
the legislative branches of government. By assuming that an ambiguous statute
does not violate international law, coulis can "redueer] the number of occasions
in which Congress unintentionally interferes with the diplomatic prerogatives of
the President."121 The eanon is based on the more fundamental premise that an

Itlhe approach of the political branches to thc human rights treaties is, for beller or worse,
a rejection of internationalism. Far fro1l1 appro\ ing the jwJiciai enhancement of domestic

law with international norms. the political branches have insisted -- at \cast in the contcxt
of international human rights law, which is thc principal foclls of the internationalist
conception -- that domestic law bc prcscrvcd unless and until the political branchcs
incorporate the international
Iii.

120!d. at 525.
121 Iii. at 52(,.
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"[ a ]ct of Congrcss ought not bc construed to violate the Constitution if any other
possible construction remains available."122 The rationale is that the
Court [should avoid an interpretation of a statute] so as to give rise to a
serious question of separation of powers which in turn would have
implicated sensitive issues of the authority of the Executive over
relations with foreign nations.' e1
The international implications of a case would lead the Court to describe it as
involving "public questions particularly high in the scale of our national interest,"
and thereby subject to an interpretive canon disfavoring violation of international
law. 124
Of course, the separation of powers rationale for the Charming BeLl),
canon is suspect when the second prong of the Chevron doctrine (allowing an
agency any permissible interpretation of legislation) and the Charming Betsy
canon come into conflict.
When the presumption against statutory violation of international law
and executive agency interpretation come

111

direct conflict, the unambiguous

congressional intent will override any contrary international obligation. In the
specific case of U.S. obligations under GATT, both Congress and federal courts
have clearly placed congressional legislation above contrary GATT language. Ie)
However, where the implementing legislation of GATT agreements, including

122 N.L.R.H. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi .. 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) (noting that it has "in a numbcr
of cases ... heeded the esscncc of ... Marshall's admonition in /\ll1rrlll'" by dcclining to interpret an Act of
Congress so as "to violate the Constitution if any othcr possible construction rcmains available").

123 Id. (citing McCulloch v. Socicdad Nacional de Marincros de Honduras, 372 U.s. 10, 83 (1963 I).
124 1d.
125 Fed. Mogul Corp. v. Unitcd Statcs. ('3 F3d 1572, 15RI (Fcd. Cir. 1995) ("[I[n the evcnt ofa
conflict betwccn a (jATT obligation and a statutc. the statutc Illust prnail."); 19 U.S.c.
3512(a)( I) ("No
provision of any of thc Uruguay Round Agrcclllcnts, nor the application of any such provision to any pcrson or
eirculllstance. that is inconsistent with any law of thc Unitcd States shall havc etlcct.").

*
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the Anti-Dumping Agrcemcnt, is ambiguous, thc Charming Betsy doctrinc may
apply. GATT and thc forming trcaty of thc WTO arc "intcrnational obligations,
and abscnt cxprcss Congrcssionallanguagc to thc contrary, statutes should not be
interpreted to conflict with international obligations."'2!> In this respect, the
Charming Bet,\y canon is in harmony with thc first prong of thc Chevron tcst

(inquiring as to whethcr a congressional act is ambiguous). 127
Thc rulcs may comc in contlict during application ofthc sccond prong of
thc Chel'ron tcst (dctcrmining whcthcr an agcncy intcrprctation is pcrmissible).
Assuming that Congress has not cxplicitly spoken to the issuc, an administrative
agency nornlally has discretion to implement the legislation in any reasonable
way.12X However, if the agency acts contrary to international law, a court may feel
inclined to intcrprct Congrcss's implicd intcnt to invalidatc the agency's
action.124

126 Fed. A4oglll. 63 F.3d at 15X I (citing the (harming Be/s!' doctrine in support of its determination
that the Anti-Dumping Agrcement should be interpreted in accordance with "international economic
understanding"), However, the F,,<I('/'ol ,i/oglll court stilluphcld Commerce's application of GATT contrary to

sllch inLcrnalionaiullucrslunuing because "Commerce b due judicial deference in part because of its established
expertise in administration of the Act, and in part bccau~c of 'the foreign policy rcpcrcu~~iol1~ of a dumping
determination,'" Id. quoting Smith-Corona Group v, United States 713 F.2d 156X, 1571 (19X-I), Sl'e 01.10
Footwear Distrib, & Rctailers of Am, v, United Stales, X52 F. Supp, IOn, 1092 (CLlnt'1 Trade 1994): Fundicao

Tupy S.A, v, United States. 652 F. Supp, 153X, 1543 (Ct. Int'l Trade I<JX7) ("An interpretation and application
of the statute which would contlict with thc GATT Code, would clearly \'iolate the intent of Congress,"),
127 See discussion ,I'llI'm Part 111.13.1.

12~ The rederal Circuit Court of Appeals quippcd that "there may be some question whelher
Commerce's new methodology is entitled to Chel'roll dcference," Fed MoglIl, 63 F,3d at 15XO, The court noted
"the uneven history of Commerce's approach to this problem." and "that Commerce's approaches have been
t(lUnd unlawful in prior decisions," !d at 1579, Nevertheless, the court applied a (h(,I'mll standard ofdeferenec
to the agency's interpretation of antidumping law because Commerce had a long-standing policy that \Vas not
unreasonably interpreted trom the statute, 1<1, at 15~0, As noted abO\e, this conmlent assllmes that a court would
utilize a Ch"''/'(!Il-likc deference to the interpretation of antidumping law by Commerce and the Trade
Administration, One reason for this assumption of deference is that a court will grant deference simply because
the agcncies arc acting within tiJreign allairs, United States v, Mead Corp" 533 U,S, 21~, 229 (200 I),
129 However. in at least one case, the Supreme Court ignored the C//(//'ming Be[s)' doctrinc
altogether and summarily refused to imply a prohibition on inlernationul abductions in the United StatesMexico Extradition Treaty based on O\erwhelming international law, U,S, v, Alvarez-Machain, 504 U,S, 655,
669 670 (1992), The Court acknowledged that the action ofLJ,S, DFA agcnts was "shocking," and that "it may
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Courts are reluctant to invalidatc executive action in foreign affairs based
on the Charming Bct.\)' doctrinc without a clear intell1ational norm. un Courts
express this reluctance "because of practical necessity and exccutive 'branch
expertise, Congress may need to delegate especially broad foreign affairs powers
to the Exccutive."I.11 This need to delegate is required because
congressional legislation which is to be madc effective through
negotiation and inquiry within the intcrnational ficld must often
accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from
statutory restriction which would not be admissible wcre
domestic affairs alone involved. I.12
Recognizing this judicial reluctance to apply international law to
invalidatc executive action, what are the sourccs of intcll1ational law that might
invoke thc Charming Bet.)' doctrinc? The Intemational Court of Justice ("IC],,),
possibly the most well-recognized intcll1ational tribunal, recognizes four
particular sources of intcmational law: (I) "intell1ational conventions"; (2)
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law"; (3)
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations"; (4) certain "judicial
decisions and thc teachings of thc most highly qualified publicists of the various

[have] belenl in violation of general international law principles."' Id. at 6(,9. However, the Court concluded that
the prohibition was not expressly written into the treaty and that Iherefixe "the decision of whether respondent
should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside ofthe Treaty, is a matter for the Executive 8ranch." Iii. In any
case, A/I'lIre:-!v/achaill breaks with the traditional canon and has not been widely accepted in the U.S. or in the
international community. S"e I" II'RNAJ JONAI. LAW 211-225 (Carter et aL cds" 4th cd, 2(03),
130 Hyundai Elcc, Co, v, United States, 53 F Supp, 2d 1334, 1345 (eL Inri Trade 1999) ("So
viewed, unless the conflict between an international obligation and Commerce's interpretation of a statute is
abundantly clear, a court slH!llld take special eare bct(lre it upsets COlllllleree's regulatory authority under the
(harmillg BI!I.IT doctrine,"),
131 Bradley, Chn'/'(m DI!/i'rellce, .I'llI'm note 55, at 6RR (citing the Cllrtiss-11,'ight decision and its
progeny in support of this judicial presumption),

13~ United States v, Curtiss-Wright Exp, Corp" 299 U,S, 304, 320 ( 1936),
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nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."133 The le1
statement of international law appears to confute any res judicata etlect of the
decisions of intemational tribunals. First, "judicial decisions" are only cited as
"subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. "1,-1 Second, the forming
treaty of the IC] specifically prohibits a res judicata etTect of the ICJ's
decisions. 135

There is no establishment of precedent by the decision of an

international court.
Similarly, the Restatement identifies three principal sources of internationallaw:
(I) [c ]ustomary international law result[ingl from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation; (2) [international agreements that either] create
law for the states parties thereto [or] lead to the creation of
customary international law when such agreements are intended
for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted;
and (3) [g]eneral principles common to the major legal systems,
even if not incorporated or reflected in customary law or international agreement ... as supplementary rules of international law
where appropriate. '36
The decisions of intemational tribunals are noticeably absent from this list of
sources of international law. Whi Ie such tribunals may be evidence of an international norm or interpretation, they are not widely recognized by U.S. courts as a
general source of law.

133 Statute of the International COLIrt of Justice, October 24,1945, arl. .lX, 59 Stal. 1031, T.S. No.

993.
134 !d

135 Id. ("The decision of Ihe Court has no binding t()rce except between the parties and in respect
of that particular casc.").
136
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There is an important distinction between customary international law
and positive treaty law: a federal court would likely require clear positive
declaration of the norm by an authoritative U.S. domestic source to invalidate an
executive foreign affairs action.137 In Garcia-Mil', the Eleventh Circuit declared
that public international law is controlling only "where there is no treaty and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision."13x The court wcnt on
to hold that, though "courts must construe American Law so as to avoid violating
principles of public international law," the executive branch may legally violate
customary international law by affirmative declaration or conducLl3'! However,
this distinction docs not apply directly to this comment because WTO panel
decisions arc not reflections of customary international

law.I~1I

Rather, panel

decisions are evidence of international understanding of the Commerce
Department's obligations under

treaty.I~1

nx

137 Garcia-Mir v. Meese,
F.2d I44(), 1453 (11th CiLl. ccrl. dellinl, 575 U.S. 1022 (19R6). In
Carcia-Jfir, the court upheld the inddinite and arhitrary detention of immigrants in the U.S. by the Attorney
General. even though such detention was contrary to international law. III. The court held that a public internationalnorm could be rendered ineffective within the U.S. if contradicted either by a legislative act, executive
act, or ajudicial decision. Id. at 1453 1455.
13R Id. quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900): see Lauritzen
571. 57X (195X)
139 Garcia-.lfir,

nx

Y·.

Larsen, 345 U.S.

F.2d at 1453.

140 A. iv'lark Weisburd . . lfll('ricall.flltiges allti IlIlemaliollull.II\.:36V.Y.\Il . .I.TR.YNS.J.\[.1. L. 1475,
152R (2003) ("l) .S. courts should react cautiously to suggestions that tilcy rely on the opinions of international
tribunals as sources of rules of Icustol11ary international law I."). In particular. \Veishurd was concerned that
International Trihunals do not usually rellect the current state of customary international law ("CIL") because
while ClL is built as a quasi-common law body of jurisprudence (developed over time by jurists), international
tribunals generally carry no precedent-creating powers and arc dilTieultto correct. Id.
141 Though this author asserts that Panel decisions may be "evidence of' international
understandings, this docs not imply that they arc necessarily reliable evidence of international understanding.
There arc many problems with the deci,ion-making processes of international tribunals that may rcnder thcir
judgments suspect. See e.g. .lenny S. Martinez, Trlll'ilrds allllll('l'I/ali(}fwl.llldicial S\'slem, 56 SlAt--:. L. RF\·. 429,
461 (2003) (noting the dilliculties of having counter-majoritarian intcrnational tribunals with no international
"supreme court" to provide continuity); John M. Czarnctzky & Ronald .I. Kychlak, All /:'mpire Of LiIll':J:
Legalism al/(I tile IIII('/'I/{{Iiollal Crimilllli COllrl, 79 NOIRlc DA~IF L. RIY'. 55, 59 (2003) (arguing that the
International Criminal Court contains a "fundamcntaillaw" because it lacks "any moral and political check as
part of[ its 1structurc").
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The interpretation of international obligations by an international
tribunal docs not have mandatory binding effects within the United States. As the
Supreme COUli noted,
while we should give respectful consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an international
court with jurisdiction to interpret such, it has been recognized in
international law that, absent a clear and express statement to the
contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of the treaty in that State. 142

Courts nonetheless grant some weight to WTO panel decisions as evidence of
international understandings of treaty obligations.
Roger Alford identified a spectrum of deference granted to the
application of international tribunal decisions. 143 Alford analyzed, among other
issues, the judiciary's treatment ofWTO panel decisions. He placed the deference
granted to WTO decisions in the middle of his continuum, where fq.lcral courts
consider the pancl decision "as part of the process of interpreting and construing
a domestic statute, without considering the possibility of directly recogniz[ing]
and enforc[ing] the [panel] decision."144
Despite the lip service paid to panel decisions as evidence of international agreement, such decisions arc apparently given little weight in practice. In

Timken, the court summarily discussed and then dismissed the WTO panel
decision at issuc in the Coms ease. 14 :i Thc court first noted that because the
14~ Breard v. Greene, 523lJ.S. 371, 375 (199X).
143 AIt'wd, supra note 53. at 731.
144 1d.
145 Tilllkell Co. v. United States, 240 F. Slipp. 2d Ing. 1243 (Ct. Inrt Trade 2(02) (disclI"ing the
EC Bcd Lil/el/ decision by the WTO Appellate Body).

274

The WTO and

Issue 1

u.s. Antidumping Law

United States was not party to the EC Bed Linen ease, there was no direet effeet
of the decision on the Icgality of U.S. zeroing practices. 146 Secondly, the court
declined to compare European and U.S. zeroing practices and found it dispositive
that the WTO decision only addressed the former. The court distinguished the
WTO decision from the issue before it because
the EC-Bed Linen decision involved a comparison, made during
an antidumping investigation, of weighted averages for export
prices and normal value, while the instant case involves a
comparison, made during an administrative review, of weightedaverage normal values to transaetion- specific export prices. '47
However, this distinction may be criticizcd because both decisions, that of thc
WTO pancl and thc Timkcn Court, were premised on review of essentially the
same methodology: zeroing. The WTO in EC Bed Linen decided generally that
zeroing was illegal and contrary to obligations under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. I-1X Timkcn is an example of a U.S. domestic court straining interpretation of a panel report in order to avoid direct contlict between the WTO and an
administrative agency.

IV. WIIAT U.S. COURTS SIIOULD Do IN

TilE FUTURE

Now that the eonnict between WTO panel decisions and U.S. executive
action in antidumping cases has been explored, we can look at the possible
solutions to this contlict. Therc are thrcc general approaches to the problem. The

14(, Iii.
147 !tI.

14X IT Bl'li UI/I!I/. \VT, DS I'll iAB.R (Mar. 1.2(01). 1/\·"i!"h!1! at 2001 WTO LFXIS 13.
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first has been termed the "Marbury" approach, where courts take significant steps
into the arena of international law and apply international jurisprudence directly
in U.S. courts. On the opposite end of the spectrum, courts may take a hands-off
approach; deferring to the executive on all matters of interpretation of international agreements and obligations under international law.
Between the two extremes, this author proposes a third approaeh that
would require the Commerce Department to defend any practices in enforcing
antidumping duties that run afoul ofWTO panel decisions. In other words, WTO
panel decisions would create a presumption as to the U.S.'s obligations under
GATT. Commerce could rebut the presumption by showing a pressing need for
judicial deference to Commerce's determination. This third approach blends the
presumptions of the Chel'l"On doctrine, the traditional deference to the executive's
role in international affairs, the Charming BeLl), canon, congressional intent that
the U.S. trade on equal and fair terms with the rest of the world, and respect for
international organizations, like the WTO, that promote trade among nations.

A. Why a "Marbltly" Approach vVould Not Work

There is an approach, sometimes referred to as the "Marbury approach,"
that seems inadequate for this question. As Marshall so famously wrote, it is "the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.''149 Some
authors have advocated a strict "rule of law" approach to foreign affairs jurispru-

149 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137. 177 (I X(3).
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dence and an abandonment of the traditional deference given to the executive in
foreign affairs. 150
While this view certainly appears attractive for its simplicity and
apparent championing of neutral legal structures, it fails to take account of the
realities of intemational relations, and in particular, intemational antidumping
law. The most obvious objection to direct judicial application of WTO panel
decisions on domestic actions of a political branch of govemmcnt is the lack of
statutory or constitutional authority to do so. The federal judiciary only has
power to decide cascs or controversies granted it by Congress or thc Constitution.
151

As noted previously, Congress has explicitly forbidden direct application of

WTO appellate decisions on domestic law. I):' Additionally, the Charming Betsy
canon would not justi fy such a direct implementation of intemational law. The
canon has never been a substantive source of law, but rather at most a tool of
construction.

B. Why a ./udicial "!fonds-of/Approach" U'ollld Not Be Advisahle

As pointed out above, there are many reasons why interpretation of trade
law should not be in the exclusive domain of the executive. 15 ] However, that only
answers half of the question, i.e., whether the Judiciary should stay out of an

150 See. e.g., Charney, slIl'm note 55, at XI J. See ,,/so Bradley, Ch('1'f"(J/1 /Jeii'rel/ce, slIl'm note 55,
at 650 n.2 (retCrencing those who slipport the "'Marbury approach"').
151 U.S.C()Nsl.arl.lll.~2,cl.l.

152 See ;\it()rd. slIl'm note 53.
15J See disclission slIl'm Part III.B.2.
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international trade law dispute between the executive branch and an international
tribunal. One must further inquire, "Why should the judiciary step in?"
As noted previously, the Charming Bet,\)' canon has come under criticism
and its continuing relevance questioned. During the height of the realist era,
interpretative canons in general were heavily criticized as contradictory,
inaccurate fictions of congressional intent, and tools of judicial activism. 154
Despite these criticisms, the Charming Betsy canon has continuing significance
if it either truly reflects a discernable legislative intent or a legitimate judicial
policy decision. Congress, by implementing the Anti-Dumping Agreement
directly in U.S. law with little modification, expressed its intent to harmonize
U.S. law with international standards. 15s FUl1her,judges may permissibly adopt a
policy of international cooperation rather than unilateral antagonism, even if the
U.S. is no longer the quaking youngster of a nation it once was. Such a policy
judgment fits well within the traditional role of a judge to "bring discretion and
judgment to statutory interpretation."15!>

wro

C. Recommended Approach: Use
Panel Decisions As Evidence
In Determining the Reasonableness oj"an Agency :\' Interpretation
of
Obligations Under International Law

u.s.

This author advocates that courts grant some weight to relevant panel
"precedent"157 when reviewing the appropriateness of Commerce's interpretation
154 Bradley, Charmillg B(!/s\', supra note 103, at 50S SOc,.
155 S(!(! gel/eralh', Final Act Embodying the Rc"dts of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade

Negotiations Gcneral Agrecmcnt on Taritls and Trade, April IS, 1994. Annex lA, 1994 WL 7614X3.
156 Bradley, Charmillg B!!/sl', supra note 103, at 509. S('!! also Jonathan R. Macey & Gcothey P.
Millcr, Till! Callo/ls oj S/a/u/OIT CO/ls/ruc/ioll alld Judicial I'r<!jl!l'<!I1(,(,s, 45 VA~D. L. RleY. M7 (1992)
(defending thc usc of canons of statutory construction generally).
157 WTO PANEL decisions arc not "precedent" in that the dccision of the Body in onc casc has no
binding authority to (a) other partics or (h) the same parties in a ditferent dispute. However. such decisions are
illustrative of what the Body would do in a similar situation.
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of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. When an executive policy regarding
antidumping clearly conflicts with a competent international tribunal's decision,
the administrative policy should be presumed unreasonable in the absence of
explicit congressional approval. Such a presumption would in effect give WTO
panel decisions a meaningful place in a traditional

Chel'IWl

analysis of the

executive's action.
This presumption of unreasonableness would be overcome by one of the
rationales for judicial deference to the executive. Specifically, the executive can
attempt to show that use of the WTO panel decision would violate an applicable
policy underpinning traditional foreign affairs deference. For example, an agency
could defeat the presumption by showing that such application of WIO panel
decisions would either (I) impcrmissibly interfere with U.S. ability to present a
united front, or a "sole voice," to the world community; (2) require a court to
make a substantive foreign policy decision unsupported by either implied
congressional intent or sound judicial policy; or (3) require a federal judge to
make a judgment regarding a matter that is within the specialized or privileged
knowledge of the agency.15X
WIO panel decisions are, at the very least, evidenee of international
understanding of U.S. obligations under international law. ls '> As such, they

ISH Of course. the Exeeutive"s range of explanations would not be limited to these three possibilities. These explanations arc presented because they are explained in this comment. Set' discussion slIJlm Part
IlIA

159 Sec slIJlm note 140. WTO panel decisions arc certainly not free of questionable intluences or
outcomes. Nonetheless. federal court rhetoric. if not decisions. typically respects the opinions of international
tribunals. Breanl v. Greene. 523 U.S. 371. 375 (199X).
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doctrine by indicating to a

U.S. domestic court that a competent international tribunal has spoken on the
particular issue of U.S. obligations under an international Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Given the context of the GATT talks and the purpose of the WTO, it
seems reasonable to assume that Congress intended the U.S. to participate in
good faith in a harmonized international trade regime, and due attention to the
decisions of WTO Panels aids that harmonization.
Applying this approach to

COI"llS,

the court would have rccognized that

COl1um:rcc may have a legitimate reason to usc a zeroing methodology while
calculating antidumping duties. Namely, such calculus may be necessary to
combat "masked dumping," a purpose that the Court of International Trade has
recognized as legitimate. 1611 Such a purpose may demonstrate a need for the Trade
Administration to exercise its unique institutional competence and specialized
knowledge to address the problem. The court, however, would not have ended the
inquiry there.
The court would have then addressed the contrary WTO panel decision
and required the Trade Administration to demonstrate a pressing need (i.e. one of
the three political deference doctrines mentioned above) for judicial deference of
the administrative agency's action in this case. Mere assertion of potential

160 Howe Passat Reinigungs-Und Waschereitechnik GMBH v. United States. 926 FSupp. 1138,
1150 (el. Int'I Trade 1996) ("Commerccjustifics usc of this mcthodology on thc ground that it is nece"ary to
combat masked dumping."); Serampore Indus. Pvl. Ltd. v. U.S. Dcp't ofComlllercc, 675 F.Supp. 1354,1361
(et. Int'I Trade 1987) ("'Coml11eree has interpreted the statute in such a way as to prevent a I()reign producer
Irolll masking its dUl11ping with morc profitable sales. COllll11erCe's interpretation is reasonable and is in
accordancc with law.").

280

Issue I

The WTO and

u.s. Antidumping Law

masked dumping would not be enough. Rather, the Administration would have to
overcome the presumption against application of antidumping law contrary to
WTO panel decisions by showing onc of thc "political questions" mentioned
above.I!>1
Such an approach would recognize that the ultimate authority on U.S.
obligations under international law rests with the domestic political branches;
Commerce could still act contrary to international opinion if it could show a
pressing need. Nevertheless, requiring an administrative agency to demonstrate
why its interpretation of antidumping law is proper, despite being contrary to
international opinion, would encourage implementation of a transparent and fair
international antidumping regime. Such a fair and transparent playing field
clearly represents the policy of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
In addition, requiring explicit reasoning by Commerce would tend to
preserve the separation of powers between the political branches and the
judiciary. A rebuttal by Commerce would grant private parties more notiee as to
when and why the U.S. is going to ignore the rules by which the rest of the world
works. Such an explicit explanation may have saved parties like those in Cants
from resorting to litigation. 162 Rather, with

Commerce's intent clear and

161 S~~ .I'llI'm note ISH.
I (,2 It is unlikely that Corus itself would have been dissuaded hom tiling suit by the approach
recommended here. ;\s noted already. COrtiS appears to be a test case in order It)r the I'uropean Community to
request a WTO Panel on the subject of ;-eroing. See VIlP/"(/ note 49. However. parties that are not part of such a
setup would likely benetit from the additional clarity required of the Commerce Department if WTO decisions
were given greater weighl by courts.
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unassailable in coul1, Corus would have been more likely to petition the political
branches directly. In the end, courts could avoid deciding sensitive trade issues
by requiring Commerce to more explicitly explain the need for foreign affairs
deference in the face of contrary WTO panel decisions.

Dan Nichols
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